The . Logic . of . Consciousness

The links in the table on the left take you to sub-headings in this article.

What I need to do is to analyse the four modes of consciousness, in order to see how relativity relates to them. These four modes are the individual consciousness (or individual identity), the social consciousness (or social identity), the dialectical consciousness, and the linguistic consciousness.

The Buddhist view of logic is more comprehensive than the view of British logicians. In his book ‘The Central Philosophy of Buddhism’, T.R.V. Murti expounds on the four possible forms or ways of logical analysis that are used in Indian theory. If X is a variable and A and B are the two possible choices in a binary system, then there are four ways that X can have value. A and B are opposite in value, so that A is not B and B is not A.

The four ways are :

1a) X = A

1b) X = B (= not A)

1c) X = A and B

1d) X = neither A nor B

I apply these ways to the four modes of relative consciousness. I want to relate each one of these ways to a corresponding mode of consciousness.

Murti recognises that factor (1c) is the Hegelian dialectic, with X being the synthesis of A and B. But he does not understand what factor (1d) is ; he merely calls it the position of the sceptic or the agnostic who denies everything.

Having identified factor (1c) as the dialectical consciousness, the remaining three modes of logic go with the remaining three modes of relativity : the individual consciousness, the social consciousness, and the linguistic consciousness. Which goes with what ?

The social consciousness is easy to establish ; this consciousness is defined by similarity – the person defines himself to be the same as other people.
Therefore the social consciousness is : X = A.

However, it is the modes relating to the sign of language and the individual consciousness that presented the difficulty to me. Initially I tried to keep Saussure’s concept of the linguistic sign intact. He taught that signs are defined by their differences from other signs.
Whence the sign of language becomes factor (1b), defined by difference :
X = not A.

This makes factor (1d) the individual consciousness.

Now factor (1d) is the form of pure relativity since it is neither purely subjective nor purely objective, and hence neither completely individual nor completely social. Whereas factors (1a), (1b) and (1c) are partial forms of relativity.

But I cannot make factor (1d) square with the individual consciousness because of the dialectical component of being. A person is partly relative and partly dialectical. This means that I cannot fit the individual into factor (1d) since the individual is not completely relative. The only way to achieve coherence is to decide that Saussure was wrong about the linguistic sign.

So for me, factor (1b) becomes the individual consciousness,
and factor (1d) is the sign of language.

Summary 1

I summarise the four modes of relative consciousness :

Consciousness can be split into its two components, the social consciousness and the individual consciousness, whereas the sign of language keeps its two components together.

Now the linguistic consciousness can be considered to be the means of developing culture, and the dialectical consciousness the means of developing self-consciousness (because abreaction brings subconscious contradictions into normal consciousness). These two modes are different, since cultural attainment does not imply learning to become self-conscious, and learning to become self-conscious is usually undertaken without desire for cultural attainment. An example of the last case is the production of psychosis – this is a chaotic way of generating self-consciousness, and culture is not usually relevant.

Summary 2

I bring in subjectivity and objectivity. The four modes can be re-stated as :

The objectivity component of factor (3a) means that the social consciousness is defined by similarity : I am the same as other people. The subjectivity component of factor (3b) means that the individual consciousness is defined by difference : I am different from other people.

The dialectical consciousness involves experiencing changes in values and meanings as the person evolves. The linguistic consciousness simply propagates values and meanings.

The Linguistic Sign

The linguistic sign, the sign of language, is defined by : X is neither A nor B. It is defined neither by similarity nor by difference. What does this mean ?

The sign has two aspects, the signifier and the signified. One aspect is defined by difference and the other one by similarity. In this way the totality of the sign cannot be reduced to either similarity or to difference. How does it compare with the dialectical consciousness ? The latter is the synthesis, the resolution of similarity and difference, of subjectivity and objectivity. Whereas the linguistic sign retains their opposition, maintains their separation.

The signifier and the signified – which one is due to similarity and which one to difference ? I take the signifier, which is the name, to be the same as Saussure’s use of it ; it is defined by difference. The signified, which is the idea, is defined by similarity. The signifier and the signified produce each other. Anything that does not have a name is not usually noticed. If it has no name then it is not recognised as a separate idea / object in its own right ; if it has no name then the thing is outside of the ideological constructs of the person. Conversely, until something is noticed it is not given a name ; to be noticeable but nameless means that boundaries cannot yet be fixed to that thing.

What is the crucial difference between my view of the sign and Saussure's view of it ?
The sign is relative ; the signifier is the subjective component and the signified is the objective component. The signifier is arbitrary but the signified is not. Because the sign is a mental construction Saussure decided that therefore the sign had to be completely arbitrary and subjective. However, to be arbitrary is not the same as to be relative, since arbitrariness has no necessary objective component to it.

What was the limiting factor to Saussure's approach?
It was a mis-understanding of the way in which the sign changes. A modern commentator (Jonathan Culler) illustrates this approach by giving an example of the change in meaning over time of a concept, using the word 'silly'. Long ago a 'silly' person was taken to be happy, blessed and pious. Nowadays, a 'silly' person is simple and foolish. Hence the concept 'silly' has changed its boundaries over time. This change is taken to indicate that "signifieds are not pre-existing concepts but changeable and contingent concepts ...". Therefore the signified is an arbitrary construction.

The error here is in not realising the close link between signs and values. Signs and values arise together, under the impetus of pleasure and pain. The agency of change is always a change in values. It is the value of a sign that is arbitrary, not the sign itself. The value is objective, since it is shared among the community ; the signified is objective too (but in a relative sense, not in an arbitrary sense).

When a signified changes, it is a change of some aspect of a relative concept concurrent with a change from one arbitrary value to a different arbitrary value.

The linguistic sign is not defined by difference, as in Saussure’s view ; nor is it defined by similarity, as in analytical logic. When the sign is completely defined by difference then it becomes Idealist (that is, a product of philosophical Idealism). When it is completely defined by similarity then it becomes realist. It is neither. It requires both factors in order to be truly representational.

Books

Culler, Jonathan. Saussure. Fontana Modern Masters, 1976.

Murti, T.R.V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. Unwin Paperbacks 1987.
The reader needs to be familiar with Indian / Buddhist terminology.

Copyright © 2002 Ian Heath
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Ian Heath
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