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The Usefulness of LogicLogical analysis is always the test of clear thinking. I turn to logic to help me discover whether Ferdinand de Saussure’s idea of the linguistic sign is correct. [¹] As a consequence of identifying the true nature of the sign, I was led to the correct understanding of the nature of relativity. What I need to do is to use logic to analyse the four modes of consciousness: the individual consciousness, the social consciousness, the dialectical consciousness [²], and the linguistic consciousness. |
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| Summary 1 |
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| Summary 2 | |
| The Linguistic Sign | |
| References |
What are these four forms or modes of consciousness?
The individual consciousness is also the individual identity of a person (his view of himself as an individual).
The social consciousness is the person’s social identity (his view of himself as a member of his social groups and networks).
The dialectical consciousness relates to specific ways of thinking within the subconscious mind ; when this form is active, the person's mental states oscillate in a dialectical way. Abreaction is a dialectical process which flows regularly through the person's life.
The linguistic consciousness is simply the way that a person uses language as a system of signs.
These
four forms
of consciousness are relative ones. Now I need to bring in my view of
relativity, which is
different from the traditional view of it. The
general
meaning of
relativity is :
In
any
relative relationship, a subjective effect is always tied to an
objective effect.
[³]
The importance of this view of relativity lies in my view that the ego is a relative construction. The ego is constructed by the new-born baby as it learns to relativise the sensory stimuli acting on it into certain recurrent shapes, shapes that one day it will recognise as being the teddy bear, the rattle, the face of the mother, etc. It learns to discriminate by relativising its sensory stimuli into patterns, and then into objects. A relative ego means that a subjective ego is always linked to some form of an objective world. [4]
I need
to analyse
these
four modes of consciousness in order to see how relativity
relates to them.
Western analytical logic is too
narrow for my requirements. So I
turn to Eastern thinkers.
The Buddhist view of logic is more comprehensive than the view of British logicians. In his book ‘ The Central Philosophy of Buddhism’, T.R.V. Murti expounds on the four possible forms or ways of logical analysis that are used in Indian theory. If X is a variable and A and B are the two possible choices in a binary system, then there are four ways that X can have value. A and B are opposite in value, so that A is not B and B is not A.
The four ways are :
1a). X = A
1b). X = B (= not A)
1c). X = A and B
1d). X = neither A nor B
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I apply these forms to the four
modes of
relative consciousness.
I
want to relate each one of these
forms
to a corresponding mode of consciousness.
Murti recognises that factor (1c) is the Hegelian dialectic, with X being the synthesis of A and B. But he does not understand what factor (1d) is ; he merely calls it the position of the sceptic or the agnostic who denies everything.
Having identified factor (1c) as the dialectical consciousness, the remaining three modes of logic go with the remaining three modes of relativity : the individual consciousness, the social consciousness, and the linguistic consciousness. Which goes with what ?
The social consciousness is
easy to
establish ;
this consciousness is defined by similarity – the person
defines himself to be the same as other people.
Therefore the social consciousness is : X = A.
However, it is the modes
relating to the
sign
of language and the individual consciousness that presented the
difficulty to me. Initially I tried to keep Saussure’s
concept of the linguistic sign intact. He taught that signs are
defined by their differences from other signs.
Whence the sign of language becomes factor (1b), defined by
difference :
X = not A.
This makes factor (1d) the individual consciousness.
Now factor (1d) is the form of pure relativity, since it is neither purely subjective nor purely objective, and hence neither completely individual nor completely social. Whereas factors (1a), (1b) and (1c) are partial forms of relativity.
But is factor (1d) really the individual consciousness?
I need to digress
for a moment.
A
person
can be considered
to
be a mixture of past and present. The present is the state of the ego
(its desires and ideals), and the past is the
kind of character and
conditioning that the person has. The past is also the realm of
determinism or karma.
Determinism or karma is partly of a dialectical nature, because of the
activity of abreaction.
Now I cannot make factor (1d) square with a person being "ego plus karma", because of the dialectical component of karma. By this characterisation of a person I mean that he /she is partly relative (the ego component) and partly dialectical (the character component). This means that I cannot fit the individual into factor (1d) since the individual is not completely relative. The only way to achieve coherence is to decide that Saussure was wrong about the linguistic sign.
So
for me, factor (1b) becomes
the
individual
consciousness,
and factor (1d) is the sign of language.
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I summarise the four modes of relative consciousness :
2a). The social consciousness, defined by similarity.
2b). The individual consciousness, defined by difference.
2c). The dialectical consciousness, defined by synthesis.
2d). The linguistic consciousness, defined by neither similarity nor difference.
Now the linguistic consciousness can be considered to be the means of developing culture, and the dialectical consciousness the means of developing self-consciousness (because abreaction brings subconscious contradictions into normal consciousness). These two modes are different, since cultural attainment does not imply learning to become self-conscious, and learning to become self-conscious is usually undertaken without desire for cultural attainment. An example of the last case is the production of psychosis – this is a chaotic way of generating self-consciousness, and culture is not usually relevant.
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I bring in subjectivity and objectivity. The four modes can be re-stated as :
3a). The social consciousness is the objective component of relativity.
3b). The individual consciousness is the subjective component of relativity.
3c). The dialectical consciousness is the synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity.
3d). The linguistic consciousness is pure relativity.
The objectivity component of factor (3a) means that the social consciousness is defined by similarity : I am the same as other people. The subjectivity component of factor (3b) means that the individual consciousness is defined by difference : I am different from other people.
The dialectical consciousness involves experiencing changes in values and meanings (what we value in life, and what life means to us). The linguistic consciousness simply propagates values and meanings. [5]
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The linguistic sign, the sign of language, is defined by : X is neither A nor B. It is defined neither by similarity nor by difference. What does this mean ?
Now
I need to bring in some
terms from semiology.
Language
is a system
of signs,
and by using signs we can communicate ideas. The sign has two
parts : a name plus an idea. These
parts are termed the signifier
and the signified. The sign is a compound of a word that
signifies, and the idea in the mind which is the signified.
The
signifier is
the
name, which includes the sound of that name.
The
image of the
object
in the mind is called the signified.
The sign has two parts, the signifier and the signified. One part is defined by difference and the other one by similarity. In this way the totality of the sign cannot be reduced to either similarity or to difference. How does it compare with the dialectical consciousness? The latter is the synthesis, the resolution of similarity and difference, of subjectivity and objectivity. Whereas the linguistic sign retains their opposition, maintains their separation.
The signifier and the signified
–
which
one is due to similarity and which one to difference? I take
the
signifier, which is the name, to be the same as Saussure’s
use of it ; it is defined by difference. The signified, which is
the idea, is defined by similarity. The signifier and the
signified produce each other. Anything that does not have a name
is not usually noticed. If it has no name then it is not
recognised as a separate idea /object in its own right ; if it
has no name then the thing is outside of the cognitive boundaries of
the person. Conversely, until something is noticed
it is not given a name ; to be noticeable but nameless means that
boundaries cannot yet be fixed to that thing.
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What
is the crucial
difference between my view of the sign and Saussure's view of it
?
The sign is relative ; the signifier is the subjective component
and the signified is the objective component. The signifier is
arbitrary but the signified is not. Because the sign is a mental
construction Saussure decided that therefore the sign had to be
completely arbitrary and subjective. However, to be arbitrary is
not the same as to be relative, since arbitrariness has no
necessary objective component to it.
What
was the limiting
factor to Saussure's approach?
It was a
mis-understanding
of the way in which the sign changes. A
modern commentator (Jonathan Culler) illustrates this approach by
giving an example of the change in meaning over time of a
concept, using the word 'silly'. Long ago a 'silly' person was
taken to be happy, blessed and pious. Nowadays, a 'silly' person
is simple and foolish. Hence the concept 'silly' has changed its
boundaries over time. This change is taken to indicate that "signifieds
are not pre-existing concepts but changeable and contingent
concepts ..". Therefore the
signified is an arbitrary
construction.
The error here is in not realising the close link between signs and values.[6]. Signs and values arise together, under the impetus of pleasure and pain. The agency of change is always a change in values. It is the value of a sign that is arbitrary, not the sign itself. The value is objective, since it is shared among the community; the signified is objective too (but in a relative sense, not in an arbitrary sense).
When a signified changes, it is a change of some aspect of a relative concept concurrent with a change from one arbitrary value to a different arbitrary value.
The linguistic sign is not defined by difference, as in Saussure’s view ; nor is it defined by similarity, as in analytical logic. When the sign is completely defined by difference then it becomes Idealist (that is, a product of philosophical Idealism).[7]. When it is completely defined by similarity then it becomes realist. It is neither. It requires both factors in order to be truly representational.
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| References |
The
number
in brackets
at the end of each reference takes you back to the
paragraph that featured
it.
The addresses of my other websites are on
the Links
page.
[¹]. My ideas on Saussure's view of the linguistic sign begin in the article Semiology. [1]
[²]. I first describe the dialectical consciousness in the previous article, The Flow of Thought, section Two Identities. [2]
[³]. My articles on Relativity begin with the article Relativity of the Ego. [3]
[4]. My view of the way that a baby constructs its ego is in the article Relativity of the Ego. [4]
[5]. Values and meanings are part of the psychological basis of language. See the article Meaning and Value on my website A Modern Thinker. [5]
[6]. See the article Semiology. [6]
[7]. Philosophical Idealism is the theory that the whole of reality is a mental phenomenon. My articles on this theory are in section 4, beginning with Subjective Idealism. [7]
Books
Culler, Jonathan. Saussure. Fontana Modern Masters, 1976.
Murti,
T.R.V. The
Central
Philosophy of
Buddhism. Unwin Paperbacks
1987.
The
reader needs to be familiar
with Indian /Buddhist terminology.
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Ian
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www.relative-mindmatter.co.uk
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